Their work, which led to Newfcon*s famous discoveries, successfully under mined the previously existing authorities for metaphor, eapecially those represented by the "Antients" and, eventually, those represented by the Bible. Still, I^Tyden was able to write poetry, not by clinging exclu sively to the old authorities, but by incorporating as well into his poetry, conscioiisly or tmcortsciously, some of the ideas and methods of the new scientists. Chief among these new ideas were attitudes forced by an emphasis on a method of reasoning which involved both Inductive and deductive thought and by an increased awareness of space and tlj&e. These need elaboration before we look at Dryden*s poetry; while the new aware ness of space and time and the inductive and deductive reasoning are often closely related, the two can be separated for purposes of explana tion.
The new philosophy has two main branches: one is usually associated with Bacon and the other with the main stream of thinkers whose work led more directly to Newton. In his History. Sprat acknowledges the Society's debt to the "new Philosopher" Bacon, "3h whose Books there are every where scattered the best arguments, that can be produced for the defense of Ebcperimental Philosophy" (p, 35) . The Baconian method of discovering truth is that process which derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all,2
This kind of thinking appears in the Royal Society in the repeated emphasis on Experiment. 3h outlining the scientists' "Method of Inquiring," Sprat lays down, "as their Fundamental law, that whenever they could possibly get to handle the Subject, the Ebcperiment was • • • performed by seme of the Members themselves" (p, $3). And he says of this procedure that the scientists have never affirm'd any thing, concerning the cause, till the trial was past; whereas, to do it before, is a most venomous thing in the making of Sciences: for whoever has fix'd on his Cause, before he has experimented; can hardly avoid fitting his Experiment. and his Observations, to his own Cause, which he had before imagined; rather than the Cause to the truth of the Experiment it self, (p, lOS)
The Baconian approach is essentially inductive and, as a result, atonistlc; a b^ief that experiment and observation will lead directly to truth assxsnes that the discrete objects one studies are real and independ* ent« We see atomistic elements in Robert Boyle, for example, a Royal.
Society member quoted by E, A, Burtt as saying that the elements of experiments are "such corporeal agents, as do not appear either to work otherwise than by virtue of the motion, size, figure, and contrivance of their own parts." Burtt goes on to say that "These parts are ultimately reducible to atoms, equipped with primary qiialities alone,
Sprat argues for more experimentation in his age, which he claims is filled with prophecies of plagues aiid public misery, prophecies Sprat does not believe constructive; he argues that the new science can help, for it is now the fittest season for Ebcpertaients to arise, to teach us a Wisdcme, which springs from the depths of &iowledge« to shake off the shadows, and to scatter the mists, which fiU the minds of men with a vain consternation.
Furthermore, in calling for the Church of En^and to support the new philosophy, Sprat^qslains that the "universal Disposition of the Age is bent upon a rational ReligionThe Church, then, should "persist, as it has begun, to incorage Experiments <» which will be to our Church as the British Oak is to our Bnpire« an ornament and defence to the soil wherein it is planted" (p, 374). Little does Sprat know that the Church will one day beccme ornamental as a result of his science.
As R. F, Jones points out, one implication of an experimental science using Baconian induction is that the received, traditional authority of the ancient philosophers is denied,^To conduct experiments without assuming causes and to allow the mind to reason freely about the observa tions made is not possible if one holds strictly to the authority of, say, Aristotle in matters of science. Sprat's criticism of the ancient philo sophers is rather direct! "Chey fix'd, and determined their judgements, on general conclusions too soon" (p. 30).
As noted earlier, the members of the Royal Society weren't guilty of generalizing "too soon," but they did generalize in a way different from (and perhaps more quickly than) Bacon's way. Alfred North VJhitehead remarks that Bacon was more concerned with the qualitative than the quan titative aspects of science:
3h this respect Bacon completely missed the tonality which lay behind the success of seventeenth century science. Science vas becoming^and has remained^pr^rily quantitative. Search for ' measurable elenents among your phenonena, and then search for relations between these measures of physical quantities. Bacon ignores this rule, of science,5
We can now easily distinguish between the two groups of seventeenthcentury i^ilosophers 5 the strict Baconians are the nonniathematical philo sophers, and the rest^whose views I will now discuss, are the mathematical philosophers.
The most essential elements of the mathematical philosop}^can be found in the methods and assumptions of Galileo and Newton. As the out line of Galileo *s method of discovering truth will suggest, many of the ideas which are given coherent expression in Newton were circulating before Newton was bom. I use Newton here because he draws together several important elements of'the new science, (The following explanation is simplified for convenience.)
The mathematical philosophers* approach to knowledge parallels the nonmathematicians' approach in that both use induction. But the iaathematicians add deduction, which is at least as important for them as is induction. Galileo's three steps necessary for discovering truthintuition or resolution, demonstration, and experiment-^will serve as a useful outline;F acing the world of sensible experience, we isolate and examine as fully as possible a certain typical phenomenon, in order firrt to totuit those simple, absolute elements in tenns of which the phencmenon can be most easily and completely translated into mathematical form; which amounts (putting the matter in another way) to a resolu tion of the sensed fact into such elonents in quantitative combina tions. Have we performed this step properly, we need the sensible facts no more; the elements thus reached are their real constituents. and deductive demonstrations from them by pure mathematics (second step) must always be true of similar instances of the phenomenon, even thou^at times it should be Impossible to confirm them empiri cally, , , • Then with the principles and truths thus acauired we can proceed to more ccmplex related phenomena and discover what additional mathematical laws are there implicated. (Burtt, p. 8l) What we need to emphasize here are those phrases which tend to justify the label mathematical: the elements are resolved into "quantitative ccanbinations," the "sensible facts" are dispensed with, and "pure mathematics"
becomes the realm of truth. The real materials of the universe are geo metric figures; truth is abstract, however ©npirical the process which leads to truth.
Newton, too, was a strong empiricist, as Burtt argues with repeated reference to Newton's own words (e.g.j pp. 212ff.), but Newton also believed in the validity of mathematical principles (e.g., pp. 209ff). Their awareness of and belief in those truths, however, was dependent not on a revelation of these truths, but on observation, experiment, and resson. The experimental methods laid down the rules for discovering truth.
God, once the source of all external authority, in this scheme lost his prestigious position, Galileo made him a "gecmetrician in his creative labours" and a "First Efficient Cause or Creator of the atoms" (Burtt, pp, 62, 99)« Hobbes argued that because an idea is always an Image (which for him must be corporeal~a belief produced from an emphasis on the importance of matter moving in space), "we have no idea,, no image of God" (Burtt, pp, , Burtt summarizes Henry More's awkward attempt to preserve God: "since every thing real is extended, God too, for More, must be an extended being" (p, 143). Whether God is written into this systoa as a creative geometrician or as a celestial mechanic isn't very Important; in either capacity he is not superior to the physical rules of the universe. His creation is subject to those rules. We know that in 1615 Galileo was using laws of mechanical motion to interpret passages of Scripture, instead of using Scripture to provide the authority to interpret the physical world.
3h the old order, explanations for natural phenomena were fitted Into a larger order (usually a religious one) and thereby denied Independent authority, Ih the chain of being, for example, the behavior, even the character, and action in the Killigrew Ode, The questions "When is this happening?" "Who is involved?" and "What is happening?" can be given more limited answers when asked about the Killigrew Ode than when asked about Lycidas. The necessity for more limited answers parsllela the new scien tists* requirement that they have the materials of experiments before them for first-hand observation; implied in the limited world of the Killigrew
Ode is the poet's ability to see for himself (or for others of this world to see with their own eyes) the literal truth of the poem.
as here on earth?" the narrator explains that "For siire the milder planets combine" and "ev'n the most malicious "were in trine" on the occasion of Ame Killigrew's birth, but he does not affirm without the reservation Implied in the opening question that her birth was the occasion for the planets' moving to ccanbinationj granted, the planets did combine, but the poet's questioning whether joy necessarily resulted from Anne KiHigrew's birth even when he sees the planets combine is a questioning of the old world view. Traditionally, the intimate relationship between the two worlds meaiit that each world participated in the activities of the other;
in fact, they were not two worlds at all, but earthly arid Heavenly manif eatations of God's world. That the worlds of Stanza III are two distinct places is further suggested by the contrast of "people of the sky" and "holiday above" with "one earth" and "mortal ears," 3h the old world viw, a physical separation was often a barrier overcome with the system of correspondences, and a metaphor valid in one time or place would have equal authority in another. There is a suggestion that such is not the case here when the image of the bees swarming around Plato's mouth is brought to us only indirectly. The metaphoric assertion that Anne Killigrew is another FLato is not present; one presumes that Drjrden would have us make that connection, but he does not insist on it himself in the poem.
The authority for Milton's metaphors rests on a broader, more uni versal base than Dryden's. Milton does not use indirection to bring into the poon "un-real" elonents which suggest how universally Lycidas' influ ence was felt. The music accompanying the two shepherds (Lycidas and the narrator) attracted Satyrs, Fauns, and "old Damoetas" (ll. 32-36). The death of Lycidas affects all of creation, and it is the death of the cre sted world* The relationship of the rose-kllllng canker, parasitic worms, and killing frost to the loss of Lycidas' music is not expressed in a simile.
There are two passages where Milton and Dryden use the same general image in different ways which should further emphasize the point here.
The narrator in Lycidas addresses Mincius and the "fountain Arethuse"
(ll, 34-85)5 Arethuse exists within the poem, Dryden's narrator (who, incidentally, is more easily called "Dryden" than the Lycidas narrator is called "Milton") refers to Anne Killigrew*s "Arethusian streams" (l, 68).
The shift from noun to adjective significantly moves Arethuse from character to qxiality, frcsa god to god-like. Similarly, the Lycidas narrator speaks of the poet*s hope "to burst out into sudden blsae" (l, 74)5 Killigrew, bom too long after the pentecostal flame, can be only "like a ball of fire" (l. 143)# The shift is from metaphor to simile, fr<ai identity to similitude. corresponding to "sage Rippodates" or "Gamus, reverend sire" or the "Pilot of the Galilean Lake" to claim ignorance or knowledge of reason or ;3ustification for death. Why? Because no one asked. Death is a given that goes unquestioned; there ,is no parallel in the Killigrew Ode to the death and resurrection in Lycidas, Milton images a universal death and resurrection when he combines death in nature-^the setting sun-^with a death symbolic of religious death and purification-human death and rebirth in water, a death and rebirth which suggest Jonah's descent -into the whale, Jesus' ability to calm the water, and baptism. The resurrection in the Killigrew Ode is much more limited; while a general resurrection is implied, the only resurrection referred to directly is that of the "sacred poets" who "foremost from the tomb shall bound," and specifically that flate." The resurrection, while presented in images not limited to this physical world, draws only on the Christian mythology, and the upward movement is contained. Killigrew is moving frcan a specific place, the tonb, to a plsce "before the choir," We can look back to the precedinĝ anza, where we learned that if any star is brighter than the rest, it is Anne Eilligrew, She is £ star, not all stars or all light. lycidas becomes the "genius of the shore," but that shore is one where "ail that wander in that perilous flood" (1. 185) can seek help; lycidas is both the provider of help and help itself. He provides aid not in one place, but in all places.
The upward movement ending the Killigrew Ode irresistibly pushes us up with "bound," "lightest ground," "on the wing," "like mounting larks" (again, a simile), and "before .
• ♦ shalt go." We go up with the "sacred poets," who "first shall hear the sound," The one poet, Anne Killigrew, can be the "harbinger of Heav'n" not because she participat-es in a universal harmony, but because, as we are once more reminded Yet what they are, ev 'n these crude thoughts were bred reading that, which better thou hast read- (11. 2?4-27) This is plainly the narrator saying "Here is how I gathered my evidence,"
And later, when he asks permission to speak plainly, "Shall I speak plain and. In a nation free, / Assume an honest layman's liberty?" (11. 316-17), the narrator again reveals the process by which he came by his knowledge#
The emphasis, again, is on how, an emphasis that reinforces the importance of a methodology that insists on observation and measurement.
Irt/hat the narrator leams, and communicates, about reason and religion is partly traditional and partly new. We have already outlined the newer view of rationalism that was a part of seventeenth-century science, but we need here a brief summary of the rationalism which preceded it. Alfred North Whitehead has called the rationalism of the later Middle Ages "the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly through a metaphysical analysis of the nature of things, which woi;ld thereby determine how things acted and functioned " (p. 39). In Herschel Baker's words, scholastic rationalism "construed God, His works, and the operations of the human mind as all exemplifying the essentially rational order of the universe";
for the scholastics, "the realm of nature is to be understood by those allegedly a priori ideas of order and reason and purpose."Î There are similar implications in the passage where I^Tydeh discusses those "men of wit" who aren't bom to believe "in gross," These are mŵ ho Must study well the sacred page and see
VJhich doctrine, this, or that, does best agree
With the whole tenor of the work divine.
And plainiiest points to Heav'n's reveal'd design;
Which exposition flows frc^genuine sense.
And which is forc'd by wit and eloquence, (ll, 328-33) Again, this is largely traditional; reason is being used to determine which interpretations of Scripture are most in simple harmony with the whole of God's plan. The emphasis on simplicity, though long used by ancient and medieval scientists (see Burtt, pp, 39ff.) , was still valid for Bryden's contemporaries in science (Burtt cites that principle as one of the major appeals in Copernicus* intezrpretation of the mottcnQf heaverily bodies), and that emphasis helped smooth the transition from traditional to more contemporary views. These "men of wit" must stxidy the evidence before them-"the sacred page"-and compare it with the larger, known truths already established in the Bible. The process of discovery here closely parallels Galileo's three-step method. The evidence used initially is the word of the Bible; from this the "whole tenor" is detemlned; the general truth, the whole tenor, is used to discover meaning in the more obscvire passages in the text.
The poet as a discoverer of truth is presented often in l^h?yden*s One of its most persistent corollaries was that of literary authori tarianism. The doctrine df imitation was indispensable, for critical theorists of the Renaissance: since the first writers were the best, subsequent literature has represented a steady decline, and a modem's safest strategy is to imitate the mighty dead. Dryden*s critical relativism was a powerful challenge a century later • '. . .
(p. 69, ri. 90)
The progress pieces in these poems lead us step-by-step through the developnent of whatever art or science to the present and to. the establish ment of an authority thst is built by the accumulation of data in the progress p:J.ece. The old saying that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts seems to apply here; when one puts together all the observed facts (the Individual observations necessary for induction; the separate elements of a progress piece), he is able to discover a greater truth.
But the process does not end here, as we will see in the epistle to Charleton, where the authority established in one area Is jpined to that of another.
The epistle to Charleton, because it deals specifically with develop ments in sclOTCe, deserves first and special attention. It begins with an attack on the "tyranny" of Aristotle and on our ancestors who "betray*d / Their free-bom reason to the Staglrlte" (ll. 1-3)» Columbus* discovery.
however accidental, provided empirical evidence to challenge the authority of Aristotle, and, according to the poem, "Colmnbus was the first that shook his [Aristotle*gl throne" (l, 9)« Columbus made it possible for more people to admire "the stars that shine In southern skies," which otherwise "Had been admlr*d by none bait savage eyes" (ll, 19-20) . The details, though general, refer to times and places of this earth. We see measure ment in the reference to the "western seas" and our "utmost bound" (l, 17)
before Columbus, and in the statement that Charleton's fame is "not clrcutnscrib'd with English ground" (l. 34)-
The British "assertors of free reason's claim," presented with a partial list of their accomplishments, form en empirical argument for the • validity of free reason. Moreover, Bacon, Gilbert, Harvey, and Boyle are strongly empirical philosophers (Burtt, , Dr. Charleton is both the completion of the list and the result of it. Dryden moves from the authority established on the preceding names to praise Charleton, whose works "unite and still discover more" of "Whatever trirths have been Tjy art or chance / Redeem'd frcm error or from ignorance" (ll. 40, 37-38) .
Dryden is praising here the processes arid accomplishments of science, and his presentation of that praise parallels the scientist's presentation of his material.
This praise leads, as Earl R. Wasserman has demonstrated,^to a celebration of the Stuart reign. The scientist's authority and research have given him political authority: "STONEHENGE, once thought a temple, you have found / A throne, where kings, our earthly gods, were crown'd" (ll. 47-4^) . That Stonehenge is a throne is one of those truths dia2h covered by Charleton, or so it was thought to be then. This process is similar to the third step outlined by Galileo; the truths united are used to discover truths in more ccsnplex phenomena* The last couplet insists on the parallel development.of science and politics: before CharletonVs work, Charles II*s refuge "then was for a temple shown, / But, he restore, *tis now become a throne" (ll, 57-58)* Moreover, the argument of the poem outlines a rough chronology as the authority of Charleton is developed.
The poem begins with Aristotle and our ancestors, moves to the more recent past of Columbus, then to the list of British scientists already wellknown in the seventeenth centiny, and then specifically to Charleton. The satire, wit, and strength of Manly i^cherly," (ll, 26-30) (The same pattern is followed in the brief poem "On Milton"; instead of claiming that the poet*s power is given to him by, for example, the Muses, Dryden presents that power as one built up in increments. This accumula tion of material is presented to us by a narrator reporting facts relative ly free of^bellishment. The two people superior in particular areas who
Join to make Milton are Homer, first iii "loftiness of thought," and Vir gil, in "majesty." After producing Homer and Virgil, though,. "The force of Nature cou*d no farther go: / To make a third she joined the former two," Tn this poem, too, the present is not subordinated to the past,)
The progress piece of painting in the epistle to Sir Godfrey Kneller, which culminates in an awareness of perspective, certainly doesn't claijn that the oldest examples of the art are best, that all since the first is in dacline. We had only the "rudiments" at first, for the "rude origi nal"; "% slow degrees the godlike art advanced," and so on (ll, 2d, 31> 35), Before the perfection of the techniques of perspective painting, Kneller, Dryden writes, "Thy genius gives thee both, -where true design,/
.Postures unforc'd, and lively colo\irs join " (11. 65-66). Dryden's summary is good; "Of various parts a perfect whole is wrought" (1. 71).
The epistle to Rieller is important-not only for those reasons that the other epistles discussed here are important, bvit also because of the comments it offers on art and the creative process. We have already seen
Kneller praised for his life-like paintings, end we are told that because of Kneller's skill, "Nature seems obedient to his will" (1. 8). Although this is traditional insofar as it places man above other things in the world around him, the influence of the new science is seen here in the removal of man from the world of nature--he is separate from it, no longer holding a relatively high position to the system. 3h comparing painting and poetry, Dryden, addressing Kneller, claims that
Thou paint'st as we describe, improving still.
When on wild natiire we engraft our skill.
But not creating beauties at our will. (11. 112-14) Nature is "wild," and the artist is able to exercise sOTie control over it. 3h fact, he appears able to improve on it in his representation:
Likeness appears in every lineament. 
